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The rising level of long-term care (LTC) expenditures and their financing sources
are likely to impact savings and capital accumulation and henceforth the pattern of
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State influences capital accumulation in a society in which the assistance the children
give to dependent parents is triggered by a family norm. We find that, with a family
norm in place, the dynamics of capital accumulation differ from the ones of a standard
Diamond (1965) model with dependence. For instance, if the family help is sizeably
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might be a complement to private insurance and foster capital accumulation.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the joint impact that alternative ways of financing
long-term care (LTC) may have on capital accumulation.
LTC consists of nursing care (as opposed to health care) for people who depend on help
to carry out daily activities such as eating, bathing, dressing, going to bed, getting up or
using the toilet.1 The demand for LTC is expected to increase. More than two out of five
people aged 65 or older report having some type of functional limitation (sensory, physical,
mental, self-care disability, or difficulty leaving home). In the EU, the relative importance
of people aged 65+ will more than double by 2050, while the relative importance of people
aged 80+ will more than triple.2 Not only the relative number of dependent elderly will
increase but also the costs because of the growing prices of services (the so-called Baumol
disease).
On the supply side, the main provider of LTC is the family. Yet, in particular in a context
of weakening family ties, individuals may also rely on the market of private insurance and
on social policy. Even though the role of the family dominates that of the State and of the
market, the relative importance of these three sources of provision varies across countries
and over time.3
The present paper acknowledges both the importance of LTC and the diversity of its
financing sources.4 It uses a two period OLG model with risk of dependence to assess the
influence of the various ways of financing LTC on capital accumulation. A casual look at the
problem may lead one to think that the effect of LTC is not going to be different from the
effect of any other type of increasing needs in old age, namely a call for more saving. In that
respect LTC is expected to stimulate capital accumulation. This reasoning is surely correct
1For a recent survey on the economics of LTC, see Cremer et al. (2012) or Siciliani (2013).
2Source: European Commission (2013a).
3For more details, see European Commission (2013b).
4Brown and Finkelstein (2011) provide an overview of the economic and policy issues surrounding insuring
LTC expenditure risk. They also discuss the likely impact of recent LTC public policy initiatives.
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as long as LTC is financed by saving or private insurance. It is incorrect if LTC services
are provided by the State or the family. Intuitively, as long as social insurance and family
solidarity operate according to a pay-as-you-go principle, each of these two financing sources
depresses capital accumulation. We show that, when different sources of LTC financing
coexist, crowding out may lead to surprising results. The most interesting one is that, if
family help is taken into account, a pay-as-you-go social LTC insurance may be a complement
to private insurance and foster capital accumulation.
Our model rests on three key assumptions. First, we assume that the main motive for
children’s assistance is a family norm.5 This idea is pervasive in sociology and gerontology.
As an example, Lowenstein and Daatland (2006) study the impact of filial norms on the
exchange of intergenerational support between adult children and older parents across five
European countries. The effect of filial norms on help provision by children is shown to be
moderate but significant and variable across countries, appearing more prescriptive in the
South than in the North.6
Second, we focus on a particular type of assistance, consisting of an investment that
children make before knowing whether their parents are dependent or not. This ex ante
investment can concern housing or children’s location and occupation choices. It is made
with the idea that it will be particularly useful in the case parents become dependent. As an
example, children may build a house with facilities that are relevant for dependent people.
The third key assumption is that parents prefer their children’s help over other sources of
LTC at least to a certain level. The idea that parents prefer being taken care by their children
than by unknown formal caregivers (see Pauly 1990)7 is standard and sometimes used to
5One generally distinguishes three motives for children helping their dependent parents: altruism, quid
pro quo exchange or family norm. The crucial impact of social norms (family ties) for solutions to the LTC
financing problem is emphasized by Costa-Font (2010).
6See also Silverstein et al. (2006).
7According to Pauly (1990), families rationally decide to forego the purchase of LTC insurance due to
intrafamily moral hazard. Instead of purchasing insurance, parents will rely on the bequest motive to induce
children to provide care. Under complete or incomplete information, Jousten et al. (2005), Pestieau and
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explain why parents avoid purchasing private insurance.8 In this paper, the dependent
parents value particularly the effort and time that children put in earning the resources that
they devote to filial help. For the early stages of dependence, this assumption seems to be
particularly compelling. In more severe cases, such as heavy dementia, the role of children
might be less valuable for the dependent parents.
Our analysis will focus not only on the steady state but also on the dynamics along
the equilibrium path. In our analysis, the role of the State is restricted to provide a social
insurance without aiming at social optimality. Its role is thus quite passive, and our approach
mainly positive. We first present what we call the benchmark model, that is, a model à la
Diamond without family help but with the possibility for the individuals to purchase private
LTC insurance. In such a setting a pay-as-you-go social insurance scheme has a consistently
depressive effect on capital accumulation. Also, there is no switch in the insurance behavior
along the equilibrium path: individuals either always insure, or they never insure.
These two features do not hold any more when we introduce the family norm. The pay-
as-you-go social insurance, when combined with the family norm, can surprisingly have an
enhancing effect on capital accumulation. This is due to the fact that social insurance reduces
family help; since family help is particularly valuable in case of dependence, individuals
might react to its reduction by increasing savings and private insurance coverage. Thus,
public insurance might actually be a complement of private insurance in presence of a family
norm. This sheds a new light on the debate, initiated by Brown and Finkelstein (2008),
about the crowding out effect of public LTC coverage on private insurance. Furthermore,
we show that, as the family help increases or decreases over time, switches in insurance can
appear; namely, along the dynamic path one can have first private insurance and then not
Sato (2008), and Kuhn and Nuscheler (2011) study the optimal design of a LTC policy in an heterogeneous
setting.
8The empirical evidence on the crowding out of private insurance by family help is mixed. For instance,
Mellor (2001) does not find substantial crowding out effects. Conversely, Costa-Font (2010) provides evidence
of a negative correlation between familistic cultures and LTC insurance coverage.
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at all, or the other way around. Finally, we show that the strength of the family norm
on assistance has a depressive effect on capital accumulation, and that the probability of
dependence affects capital accumulation in a non-monotonic way.
Economists have hardly treated the relationship between long-term care expenditures
and capital accumulation.9 The closest works are the ones on the effect of health care and
of social security on growth. The literature on health investment, longevity and growth, is
extensive, but has a different emphasis.10 The literature on social security and growth finds
that unfunded pension schemes have a depressive effect on capital accumulation relative to
fully funded pensions or standard saving. The results of this literature are different from
ours in that it always finds that old age family arrangements have the same effect as pay-
as-you-go pensions except that they imply much larger incentive effects on either fertility or
longevity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model.
In Section 3, we study the benchmark case without family norm. We allow for a family
norm in Section 4, and we study how the parameters of the economy affect the dynamics
and the steady state of capital accumulation. We conclude in Section 5. We present proofs
and analytic developments in several technical appendices.
2 The economy
We consider an overlapping generations model where time is assumed to be discrete. All
agents (individuals and firms) are price-takers, and all markets are competitive. Individuals
live two periods and, without loss of generality, the size of the population is assumed to be
constant. An individual born in t supplies one unit of labor in the first period and receives
the market wage wt. In the second period he is retired and is dependent with probability
p ∈ (0, 1). In this case, he needs LTC.
9Some exceptions can be found in Ehrlich and Lui (1991) and Hemmi et al. (2007).
10See the literature review of Chen (2007) and Gong et al. (2012).
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2.1 The financing of LTC needs.
LTC needs can be financed through different channels: the market, the State and the family.
The market. Individuals can use the market to provide for their LTC needs. First
of all, they can self-insure through precautionary savings. By saving st in their young age
they receive Rt+1st in their old age, where Rt+1 is the interest factor. Note that this way
of financing LTC is not efficient, since ex-post savings are too high if the individual is
not dependent. Alternatively, individuals can purchase an amount it ≥ 0 of private LTC
insurance in the first period. Then, they get an insurance allowance Rt+1it/p in case of
dependence in the second period. We thus assume that the insurance contract is actuarially
fair.11 In the following, we will say that individuals insure whenever they purchase private
LTC insurance. Of course, even if they do not insure, they might (partially) self-insure
through precautionary savings.
The State. The government may provide social LTC insurance through a pay-as-you-go
system, by setting a linear tax τ ∈ [0, 1) on the labor income of the young in order to finance
a transfer to the dependent. Then, each dependent elderly born in t receives a transfer
τwt+1/p. We thus assume no loading factor in social LTC insurance.
The family. The family can provide help to the dependent. In each period t, young
individuals devote a fraction xt ∈ [0, 1 − τ ] of their income to their parent.
12 This fraction
is chosen before children know whether or not their parents are dependent.
The fraction of income devoted to parents depends on the past filial help behavior. Each
individual observes the fraction Zt−1 = xt−1 + τ ∈ [0, 1) which his parent was willing to
devote to his grandparent and the evolution13 of Zt across time follows the process Zt =
πZt−1 + π(1− π), where π ∈ [0, 1] captures the intensity of transmission of the family norm.
11We showed in an earlier draft, considering a loading factor on the insurance premium does not qualita-
tively modify the analysis.
12The underlying assumption is that children are credit constrained.
13This reduced form is in the spirit of the ones generally used in education models which consider that
the dynamics of human capital accumulation follows a known (exogenous or endogenous) process.
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Thus, Zt is increasing in Zt−1, and it is equal to 0 if the family norm is not transmitted (i.e.
π = 0), and equal to Zt−1 if the norm is perfectly transmitted (i.e. π = 1). In words, π can
be viewed as the intensity of intergenerational imitation (or of transmission of the family
norm). Since Zt = xt + τ , the evolution of the voluntary help xt follows a linear process:
xt+1 = max
{
0, ψ(xt)
}
with ψ(xt) = πxt + (1− π)(π − τ) (1)
This (linear) reduced form is consistent with the “demonstration effect” developed by
Cox and Stark (2005) who state that parents who desire being helped in the future have an
incentive to make transfers to their own parents in order to instill appropriate preferences
in their children.14 They posit that the demonstration is not perfect by assuming that with
probability ̟ a child will simply imitate his parent’s action, while with probability 1 − ̟
he will choose an action to maximize his expected utility, aware though that his own child
may be an imitator. Applying this approach to our dynamic settings leads to obtain a linear
process for the evolution of family help.
Another feature of our specification is that the parents weight the help they receive from
their children more than any other transfers (from savings, private and/or social insurance).
Indeed, an individual does not merely value his child’s help as xt+1wt+1, but as x
σ
t+1wt+1
with σ ∈ (0, 1) measuring the importance of filial help for the parent. The lower σ, the
higher the evaluation of xt+1 is (with respect to the other sources of income) for the parent.
This captures the fact that, at least in the early stage of dependency15, the elderly prefer
being taken care by relatives rather than by unknown caregivers (see Pauly, 1990). Since an
increase in children’s help is less valuable if the help is already high, our formulation also
takes into account the fact that the parent gets a psychological benefit from filial help, but
might feel guilty to receive too much of it. In the limit, if the children devote all their income
14For an application of this method to a model of LTC financing without capital accumulation, see Canta
and Pestieau (2013).
15There exist several stages of dependence that can be characterized by the dependent elderly’s ability to
perform in different areas of cognition and functioning: orientation, memory, judgment, home and hobbies,
personal care, and community.
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to their parents (i.e. xt+1 = 1), the latter do not get any psychological gain from filial help,
and evaluate xt+1wt+1 as a mere monetary transfer.
Since our goal is to analyze the role of family help in presence of (potential) LTC needs,
the family help is here most valuable for the parents in case of dependence. However, this
help is not necessarily sunk: if the parent does not turn out to be dependent, he weights the
family help by a parameter γ < 1.
2.2 The production process.
In any period t a single good is produced using two factors, capital Kt and labor Lt. Produc-
tion occurs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology AKαt L
1−α
t with A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1).
Equilibrium Prices. As markets are perfectly competitive, each factor is paid its
marginal product. Assuming that capital fully depreciates after one period we obtain:
wt = A(1− α)k
α
t and Rt = Aαk
α−1
t (2)
where kt = Kt/Lt is the capital stock per worker in period t.
Inter-temporal equilibrium. As the endowment of capital at each period is equal to
the resources that were not consumed in the preceding period, the capital stock in period
t + 1 is financed by precautionary saving st and private LTC insurance it. Since the size of
the population is constant, we have:
kt+1 = st + it (3)
In words capital accumulation depends on optimal individual decisions.
2.3 The optimal individual behavior.
In order to understand individual behavior, we first define individual welfare. We then solve
the individual optimization program, and study insurance decisions.
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Individual welfare. In the first period, each young individual devotes a fraction xt
of his wage wt to his elderly parent, and a fraction τ to the government.
16 He devotes his
remaining income to consumption ct, precautionary savings st, and private LTC insurance
it. In the second period, he consumes Rt+1st, receives the help from his child and, in case
of dependence, receives also the benefits of both the private and the social LTC insurance,
respectively Rt+1it/p and τwt+1/p.
The welfare Wt of an individual born in t is:
Wt = u(ct) + β
{
(1− p)Hnot dep(st, xt+1) + pH
dep(st, it, xt+1, τ)
}
with β ∈ (0, 1) is the psychological inter-temporal discount factor and
ct = (1− τ − xt)wt − st − it
The function H(.) corresponds to second-period utility and is given by
Hnot dep(.) = u
[
Rt+1st + γx
σ
t+1wt+1
]
if the individual is not dependent and otherwise by
Hdep(.) = (1 + ξ)u
[
Rt+1
(
st +
it
p
)
+
(τ
p
+ xσt+1
)
wt+1
]
−D
with ξ > 0 and D > 0.
The function H(.) takes into account the fact that the individual does not attribute the
same value to the voluntary transfer received from his child as to other means of financing
LTC. Importantly, Hdep
′
(κ) > Hnot dep
′
(κ) captures the fact that dependent individuals have
higher needs.17 The parameter D > 0 measures the utility loss implied by dependence and
16We thus implicitly assume that child’s help is subject to payroll taxation exactly like precautionary
saving and private LTC insurance. The alternative implying ct = (1− τ)(1− xt)wt − st − it would not have
conducted to much different results.
17The assumption that Hdep
′
(κ) > Hnot dep
′
(κ) = u′(κ) may be disputed (see, for instance, Finkelstein
et al. 2009, 2013), since some goods may substitute or complement good health. Our assumption remains
reasonable up to a certain wealth level, and we implicitly assume in this paper that this wealth threshold is
not reached.
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is assumed to be high enough to ensure that Hdep(κ) < Hnot dep(κ) for any feasible value of
κ.18
Finally, for the sake of tractability, the instantaneous utility function u(.) is assumed to
be logarithmic.
The optimization problem. From now on, we use the indicator function 1l ≡ 1lπ>τ≥0
to encompass the benchmark case without family help where 1l = 0 (i.e. π = τ = 0 and
π = 0 < τ < 1) and the case with family help where 1l = 1 (i.e. π > τ ≥ 0).19 Then, using
(1) an individual born in t solves the following problem:
max
st,it
Wt = max
st,it
{
ln
[
(1− τ − xt1l)wt − st − it
]
+ (1− p)β ln
[
Rt+1st + γψ
σ(xt)1lwt+1
]
+pβ(1 + ξ) ln
[
Rt+1
(
st +
it
p
)
+
(τ
p
+ ψσ(xt)1l
)
wt+1
]
− pβD
}
under the non-negative constraints st ≥ 0 and it ≥ 0.
To avoid unrealistic corner solutions in which individuals do not self-insure through pre-
cautionary savings (and then rely exclusively on family help if they are not dependent), we
will make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. γ < 1/(1 + ξ).
As it is shown in Appendix A, Assumption 1 is sufficient (but not necessary) to have a
positive st. Intuitively the weight γ of the family help is perceived by the parent as being
low and incite him to self-insure through precautionary savings.
Hence, the first order condition (FOC) with respect to st is:
−1
(1− τ − xt1l)wt − st − it
+
βp(1 + ξ)
st +
it
p
+
[
τ
p
+ ψσ(xt)1l
]
wt+1
Rt+1
+
β(1− p)
st +
[
γψσ(xt)1l
]wt+1
Rt+1
= 0 (4)
18Since we always obtain bounded steady states solutions, the resources of the economy are always finite
and consumption is bounded by a threshold κmax. Since H
dep(κ) < Hnot dep(κ) = u(κ) for any κ < κ˜ =
u−1[D/ξ], it is sufficient to assume that D is such that κmax < κ˜.
19If 0 < pi < τ , family help may vanish along the equilibrium path. We thus rule out this case (see
Assumption 2).
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Remark that without transfers from external sources (i.e. τ = π = 0), this FOC would
not depend on Rt+1.
Insurance behavior. The unconstrained solution for it could be negative, leading to a
corner solution. Conversely, when individuals insure the FOC with respect to it is:
−1
(1− τ − xt1l)wt − st − it
+
β(1 + ξ)
st +
it
p
+
[
τ
p
+ ψσ(xt)1l
]
wt+1
Rt+1
= 0 (5)
Then, we formally obtain the following optimal level for insurance (see Appendix A.1):
it =

0 if δξ ≤ ε(xt)
[δξ − ε(xt)]st
δ/p+ ε(xt)
if δξ > ε(xt)
(6)
with δ = α/(1− α) and ε(xt) = τ/p+
[
1− γ(1 + ξ)
]
ψσ(xt)1l.
Depending on the values of τ , p, ξ, γ, σ, π and xt, ε(xt) can take any values in [0,+∞)
while δξ can take any values in (0,+∞). This will lead to different dynamics of capital
accumulation depending on the relative importance of sources of LTC financing.
3 Benchmark case: absence of family help
In order to understand the role of the family, we will first study an economy where the
family help is not operative, i.e. individuals cannot directly help their elderly parents. We
will denote this case with the subscript d, since it corresponds to the model of Diamond
(1965) adapted to allow for dependence.
3.1 The market.
First, consider the case where the government does not intervene, i.e. τ = 0. Then, there are
no intergenerational transfers, ε(xt) = 0, and individuals only provide for dependence in old
age through precautionary savings or private LTC insurance. According to (6), individuals
insure and this decision is independent of the capital stock. Based on equations (2) to (6),
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the dynamics of capital accumulation are given by (see Appendix B.1):
kt+1 = ζpk
α
t with ζp =
A(1− α)(1 + pξ)β
1 + (1 + pξ)β
(7)
Intuitively, individuals always transfer a share A−1ζp/(1 − α) of their wage wt to the
second period using precautionary savings and private LTC insurance. According to (7),
there exists a unique positive steady state capital stock,
kd|τ=0 =
[
A(1− α)β(1 + pξ)
1 + (1 + pξ)β
] 1
1−α
which is globally stable in IR⋆+, i.e., for all k0 ∈ IR
⋆
+, the optimal path {kt}t≥0 converges
monotonically to kd|τ=0.
Remark that, in the case without dependence, we find the well-known dynamics of the
standard Diamond’s model i.e: kt+1 = ζ0k
α
t with ζ0 = A(1 − α)β/(1 + β). Compared
to this standard model, we have introduced the probability of dependence. Since kd|τ=0
increases in p, the probability of dependence has a positive impact on capital accumulation
(see Appendix B.2). The higher the probability of dependence, the higher the savings and/or
insurance coverage.
3.2 The market and the State.
We now consider the case where the government intervenes through the social (unfunded)
LTC insurance described in Section 2.1, i.e. ε(xt) = τ/p. Individuals take this into ac-
count when choosing how much private LTC insurance to purchase and how much to save.
According to (6), they insure if and only if pδξ > τ .
Three remarks about this condition can be made. First, the decision to insure is invariant
through time and is not affected by the capital stock. Second, if the tax rate is relatively
high individuals do not insure. The social LTC insurance crowds out the private LTC one.
Third, individuals trade-off between the return of precautionary savings R and the one of
private LTC insurance R/p. Thus, the higher is p the higher the attractiveness of private
LTC insurance.
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According to equations (2) to (6), the dynamics of capital accumulation can be described
by (see Appendix B.1):
kt+1 = ϑdk
α
t (8)
with:
ϑd =

ηd ≡
A(1− α)(1− τ)β[αp(1 + pξ) + (1− α)(1− p)τ ]
αp[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1− α)[1 + (1− p)β]τ
if pδξ ≤ τ
µd ≡
A(1− α)(1− τ)αβ(1 + pξ)
α[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1− α)τ
if pδξ > τ
Since the sign of pδξ − τ is time-independent, no switch in the insurance behavior is
possible: individuals choose either to insure or not to insure in all periods. We can thus
identify two regimes, characterized by the presence (or absence) of private LTC insurance
along the optimal path {kt}t≥0. The existence of these two different dynamics is due to
the presence of the social LTC insurance. As we have shown above, the insurance behavior
does not affect capital accumulation when the government does not intervene (i.e. ηd|τ=0 =
µd|τ=0 = ζp).
According to (8), there exists a unique positive steady state capital stock,
kd =

knd ≡
(
A(1− α)(1− τ)β [αp(1 + pξ) + (1− α)(1− p)τ ]
αp[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1− α)[1 + (1− p)β]τ
) 1
1−α
if pδξ ≤ τ
kid ≡
(
A(1− α)(1− τ)αβ(1 + pξ)
α[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1− α)τ
) 1
1−α
if pδξ > τ
which is globally stable in IR⋆+, i.e., for all k0 ∈ IR
⋆
+, the optimal path {kt}t≥0 converges
monotonically to kd.
Remark that the steady state is such that kd = max
{
kid, k
n
d
}
, where the superscripts “n”
and “i” denote “no insurance” and “insurance”, respectively.
We can now look more closely at the effect of τ on capital accumulation (see Appendix B.3
and Figure 1).20 The capital stocks kid and k
n
d are both decreasing functions of τ . When the
20In all figures illustrating the comparative statics with respect to the steady state capital stock k, we
always assume, that k varies in a convex way. However, depending on the cases and the parameters specifi-
cations, k may also vary in a concave way.
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τk
0 1
kid
knd
τa
Ins. No ins.
Figure 1: The steady state capital stock kd as a function of τ .
tax rate increases, the disposable income decreases and this income effect reduces savings and
capital accumulation. Furthermore, individuals insure if and only if τ < τa = min{pδξ, 1}.
Intuitively, as τ increases, individuals get more social LTC insurance, which discourages
precautionary savings and private LTC insurance.
To conclude, our results are standard, and mirror Diamond’s model with the only dif-
ference that we introduced dependence and LTC insurances. They can be summarized as
follows:
Proposition 1 – Without family help, the capital stock kt converges monotonically to kd.
The steady state capital stock decreases as the tax rate increases. The insurance behavior is
time invariant. If the tax rate τ and/or the probability 1−p are sufficiently low (resp. high),
individuals always insure (resp. never insure).
We will now study whether these results are robust to the introduction of the family.
4 The State, the market, and the family
We now consider the case where children can help their parents. As described previously,
family help is triggered by a norm imposing that a certain fraction of children’s earnings is
devoted to the parents.
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In the following we characterize first the dynamics of voluntary family help, then the
dynamics of capital accumulation. Finally, we study the effect of the intensity of intergener-
ational imitation, the probability of dependence, and the tax rate on the steady state capital
stock.
4.1 The dynamics of family help.
We here want to focus on the case where the family help is always operative. Henceforth we
restrict our study as follows.
Assumption 2. τ < π and x0 < 1− τ .
Assumption 2 ensures that xt ∈ (0, 1− τ).
21 Then, the dynamics {xt}t≥0 of family help
described by (1) and represented in Figure 2 converge monotonically to x˜ = π − τ .
xt+1 = xt
xt+1 = ψ(xt)
xt
(1− π)(π − τ)
π − τ
1− τ
π(2− π)− τ
xt+1
x˜x0 x′00 1− τ
Figure 2: The dynamics of family help xt+1 = ψ(xt).
Remark that the fraction xt+1 is linear in xt, and non-linear in π. Indeed, given xt, xt+1
is a concave function of π, increasing up to π¯t = (1 + xt + τ)/2 and decreasing afterwards.
Then, the parameter π ∈ (τ, 1] measures the intensity of imitation, but also its imperfection.
This allows the individuals to devote a bigger or a smaller share with respect to the past
generation. If π ∈ (τ, xt + τ), the imitation is weak and children transmit a smaller fraction
21If τ > pi, then there exists a date after which xt = 0, and we would be in the case studied in Section 3.
The case x0 > 1− τ has already been excluded because children are credit constrained.
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than their parents did (i.e., xt+1 < xt). If π ∈ (xt+ τ, 1), the imitation is strong and children
transmit a bigger fraction than their parents did (i.e., xt+1 > xt). Finally, in the limit case
where π = 1, imitation is perfect, and xt+1 = xt.
4.2 The global dynamics.
Insurance behavior. According to (6), individuals insure if and only if δξ > ε(xt). Here,
it is important to emphasize that ε(xt) depends on xt and is then time-dependent. Thus,
contrary to the benchmark case, changes in the insurance behavior over time are possible.
Assumption 1 ensures that ε(xt) increases in xt. Then, ε(xt) and δξ cannot cross more
than in one point denoted by xˆ. Consequently, individuals insure for any xt < xˆ and do
not insure for any xt > xˆ. Since the dynamics of xt are monotonic (increasing if x0 < x˜
and decreasing if x0 > x˜) and independent of kt, two cases can arise. When δξ is neither
too high nor to low, xˆ belongs to I = [min{x0, x˜},max{x0, x˜}]. Then, there exists a unique
period T after which the sign of the sequence {xt − xˆ}t≥0 changes. Individuals change their
insurance behavior after period T . When δξ is very high or very small, xˆ does not belong to
I and individuals either never insure or always insure. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, one (and
unique) switch in the insurance behavior is possible and we can thus distinguish four regimes
characterized by the insurance behavior along the equilibrium path (see Appendix C.4).
When δξ ≤ min {ε(x0), ε(x˜)}, there is no insurance in any period (Regime I). When δξ >
max {ε(x0), ε(x˜)}, there is positive insurance in any period (Regime II). When ε(x˜) < δξ ≤
ε(x0) the dynamics display a switch from no insurance to insurance along the equilibrium
path (Regime III). Finally, when ε(x0) < δξ ≤ ε(x˜), the dynamics displays a switch from no
insurance to insurance (Regime IV).
The dynamics of capital accumulation. Importantly, the impact of the parameters
of interest on the insurance behavior, described above, is independent qualitatively of the
level of γ. Thus, without loss of generality but for the sake of tractability, we illustrate the
dynamics of capital accumulation when γ = 0. In this case, ε(xt) = τ/p + ψ
σ(xt) can be
interpreted as the transfer that an individual in t + 1 receives in case of dependence from
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external sources (the State and his child). According to equations (2) to (6), these dynamics
are given by (see Appendices A.2 and A.3):
kt+1 = ϑ(xt)k
α
t (9)
with:
ϑ(xt) =

η(xt) ≡
A(1− α)(1− xt − τ)β[α(1 + pξ) + (1− α)(1− p)ε(xt)]
α[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1− α)[1 + (1− p)β]ε(xt)
if δξ ≤ ε(xt)
µ(xt) ≡
A(1− α)(1− xt − τ)βα(1 + pξ)
α[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1− α)pε(xt)
if δξ > ε(xt)
Using ε(x˜) = τ/p + (π − τ)σ and according to (9), there exists a unique positive steady
state capital stock,
k˜ =

k˜n ≡
(
A(1− α)(1− π)β[α(1 + pξ) + (1− α)(1− p)ε(x˜)]
α[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1− α)[1 + (1− p)β]ε(x˜)
) 1
1−α
if δξ ≤ ε(x˜)
k˜i ≡
(
A(1− α)(1− π)βα(1 + pξ)
α[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1− α)pε(x˜)
) 1
1−α
if δξ > ε(x˜)
Remark that the steady state capital stock is such that k˜ = max
{
k˜i, k˜n
}
.
The dynamics of {kt}t≥0 are more complex with family help than in the benchmark case,
because η(xt) and µ(xt) depend on xt.
The global dynamics. According to (1) and (9), the dynamic system (kt, xt) is de-
scribed by:  kt+1 = max
{
η(xt), µ(xt)
}
× kαt
xt+1 = ψ(xt) = πxt + (1− π)(π − τ)
It is globally asymptotically stable and converges to a unique steady state: the pair (k˜, x˜).
We can thus distinguish the four regimes characterized by the insurance behavior along the
equilibrium path evoked in the beginning of this section (see Figure 3).22
Our main results established Appendix C can be summarized as follows:
22In Figure 3, g(x) = η(x)
1
1−α whereas h(x) = µ(x)
1
1−α .
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kx
xt+1 = xt
g(x)
1− τx˜
k˜n
•
•
•
No insurance
•
•
•
A – Regime I: δξ ≤ min {ε(x0), ε(x˜)}
k
x
xt+1 = xt
h(x)
1− τx˜
k˜i
•
•
•
Insurance
•
•
•
B – Regime II: δξ > max {ε(x0), ε(x˜)}
k
x
h(x)
g(x)
xt+1 = xt
x˜
•
•
•
Ins. No insurance
1− τ
k˜i
xˆ
C – Regime III: ε(x˜) < δξ ≤ ε(x0)
k
x
h(x)
g(x)
x˜
k˜n
x0
•
•
•
Insurance No insurance
xt = xt+1
xˆ
D – Regime IV: ε(x0) < δξ ≤ ε(x˜)
Figure 3: The global dynamics with family norm.
Proposition 2 – The dynamic system (kt, xt) is defined by (9) and (1). For all (k0, x0) ∈
IR⋆+×IR+, this system is globally asymptotically stable and converges to (k˜, x˜). The dynamics
of capital accumulation are not necessarily monotonic.
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Individuals always (resp. never) insure if δξ is sufficiently high (resp. low). For inter-
mediate values of δξ and x0 < x˜ (resp. x0 > x˜), individuals insure (resp. do not insure) up
to a certain period, and then decide not to insure (resp. insure). Thus, one (and unique)
switch in the insurance behavior is possible.
Contrary to the benchmark case without family help, the dynamics of capital accumula-
tion are not necessarily monotonic and might be characterized by switches in the insurance
behavior. Intuitively, since the family help and the private LTC insurance are substitutes,
the dynamics of family help affect the insurance behavior over time. If family help increases
over time, individuals might reduce the purchase of private LTC insurance. After a certain
period, the market for private LTC insurance completely disappears. To the contrary, if
family help decreases over time, the market for private LTC insurance might emerge after a
certain period.
4.3 Comparative statics.
We now study the impact of the parameters of the economy on insurance behavior and long
run capital accumulation.
Insurance behavior. First of all, we can analyze how variations in π, p, and τ affect
the insurance regime in the steady state (see Appendix D.1). Since private LTC insurance
occurs at the steady state if and only if δξ > ε(x˜), it is sufficient to study how ε(x˜) varies
with these parameters. As ε(x˜) is increasing in π, there exists a threshold πa such that
individuals insure if and only if the degree of intergenerational imitation is smaller than
πa. When τ > 0, the ε(x˜) is decreasing in p so that there exist a threshold pa such that
individuals insure if and only if the probability of dependence exceeds pa. When τ = 0, the
insurance regime does not depend on p. Finally, the derivative of ε(x˜) with respect to τ has
the sign of τ − τ with τ = π− [pσ(1− γ(1+ ξ))]1/(1−σ). If π < [pσ(1− γ(1+ ξ))]1/(1−σ), then
ε(x˜) always decreases in τ , and there exists a threshold τb such that individuals insure if and
only if the tax rate exceeds τb. If π ≥ [pσ(1 − γ(1 + ξ))]
σ−1, there exist two thresholds, τc
and τd, such that insurance occurs if and only if the tax rate is smaller than τc or greater
19
than τd.
It is worth noting that the impact the impact of the parameters of interest on the insur-
ance behavior, described above, is independent qualitatively of the level of γ. Thus, without
loss of generality and for the sake of tractability, we follow the Section 4.2 by illustrating the
comparative statics on capital accumulation when γ = 0.
Intensity of intergenerational imitation. We now study the impact of π, the inten-
sity of imitation, on capital accumulation (see Appendix D.2 and Figure 4). As π increases
from τ to 1, ε(x˜) increases from τ/p to τ/p+ (1− τ)σ. Then, the steady state capital stock
k˜ is k˜i (and individuals insure) whenever π < πa = τ + max{0,min{(δξ − τ/p)
1/σ, 1 − τ}},
and k˜n (and individuals do not insure) if π ≥ πa. Since k˜
i and k˜n, the steady state capital
stock k˜ is always decreasing in π ∈ (τ, 1].
π
k
τ 1
k˜i
k˜n
πa
Ins. No ins.
Figure 4: The steady state capital stock k˜ as a function of π.
Intuitively, if π increases, the fraction of income x˜ devoted to elderly parents increases.23
On the one hand, this reduces the disposable income in young age. On the other hand, this
also increases the transfer that individuals expect from their children. These two effects lead
to a reduction in precautionary saving and private LTC insurance and, consequently, in the
capital stock.
23Note that this is not necessarily the case along the equilibrium path since ∂xt/∂pi is negative when
pi > (1 + xt−1 + τ)/2.
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Probability of dependence. The impact of p on capital accumulation is somehow
more complex (see Appendix D.3). It depends on whether the government intervenes or not
in providing social LTC insurance.
p
k
0 1
k˜n|τ=0
No insurance
A – δξ ≤ πσ
p
k
0 1
k˜i|τ=0
Insurance
B – δξ > πσ
Figure 5: The steady state capital stock k˜ as a function of p when τ = 0.
When the government does not intervene, ε(x˜) = πσ does not depend on p and two
cases can be identified depending on the intensity of intergenerational imitation. When π
is sufficiently high (i.e., δξ ≤ πσ) the family help is so high that individuals decide not to
insure. Note also that the steady state capital stock k˜n|τ=0 decreases when p increases (see
Figure 5A). Intuitively, as the probability of dependence increases, it becomes less interesting
to transfer consumption to the non-dependent state, while the LTC needs will be met by
family help. When π is sufficiently low (i.e., δξ > πσ), individuals decide to insure and the
steady state capital stock k˜i|τ=0 is increasing in p (see Figure 5B). Intuitively, the higher the
probability of dependence, the more individuals insure for old age, so that the capital stock
increases.
Consider now the case where τ > 0. As p increases from 0 to 1, the threshold ε(x˜)
decreases from +∞ to τ + (π− τ)σ. Consequently, when δξ is sufficiently low (i.e., δξ ≤ τ +
(π−τ)σ) individuals decide not to insure and the steady state capital stock k˜n decreases (resp:
increases) when p is lower (resp: larger) than a threshold p ∈ (0, 1] defined Appendix D.3
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(see Figure 6A). Thus, we find that the relationship between the probability of dependence
and capital accumulation can be non monotonic. Intuitively, when p is sufficiently low,
individuals fully rely on the social LTC insurance and family help. As the probability
of dependence increases, it becomes less interesting to transfer consumption to the non-
dependent state, while the government and the family help cover the dependent state. Thus,
the capital stock k˜n decreases. Conversely, when the probability p is high, the return of
social insurance, τ/p, is very low, and individuals increase their own savings, so that the
capital stock k˜n increases.
p
k
0 1
k˜n
No insurance
p
A – δξ ≤ τ + (π − τ)σ
p
k
0 1
k˜i
k˜n
p pa
No ins. Insurance
B – δξ > τ + (π − τ)σ
Figure 6: The steady state capital stock k˜ as a function of p when τ > 0.
When δξ is sufficiently high (i.e., δξ > τ+(π−τ)σ) individuals decide not to insure when
p ≤ pa = τ/[δξ − (π − τ)
σ] and insure when p > pa. As 0 < p < pa < 1, the steady state
capital stock, k˜n, decreases when 0 < p < p and increases when p < p < pa. Finally, the
steady state capital stock, k˜i, increases when pa < p < 1 (see Figure 6B). Remark that the
threshold pa increases in π: as the imitation becomes more intense, individuals insure for a
smaller range of probabilities of dependence. This is a standard case of crowding out.
The social LTC insurance crowds out private LTC insurance, so that individuals insure
only if τ is small enough. The size of τ also affects the impact of the probability of depen-
dence on the insurance decision. To show this, let us compare the case where τ = 0 and
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τ > 0, limiting the analysis to the case where π is small enough (Figures 5B and 6B): indi-
viduals always insure with no public intervention, while in presence of social LTC insurance,
individuals insure as long as p > pa.
Tax rate. In order to inform policy makers about the optimal social LTC insurance, it is
important to assess the impact of the tax rate on capital accumulation (see Appendix D.4).
We can distinguish two cases depending on the value of π, reminding that the derivative of
ε(x˜) with respect to τ has the sign of τ − τ . As γ = 0, we have τ = π − (pσ)1/(1−σ).
When π ≤ (pσ)1/(1−σ), as τ increases from 0 to π, the threshold ε(x˜) decreases from πσ
to π/p. Then, the steady state capital stock k˜ is k˜i (and individuals insure) if τ > τb, while
it is k˜n (and individuals do not insure) when τ ≤ τb with:
τb =

0 if δξ ≤
π
p
τ ⋆b ∈ (0, π) if
π
p
< δξ < πσ
π if δξ ≥ πσ
where τ ⋆b ∈ (0, π) is the unique root of the function Λ(τ) = δξ − ε(x˜). Furthermore, an
increase in the tax rate has always a positive impact on the steady state capital stock (see
Figure 7A).
τ
k
0 π
k˜n
k˜i
τb
No ins. Ins.
A – π ≤ (pσ)
1
1−σ
τ
k
0 π
k˜i
k˜n
k˜i
τ τdτc
Ins. No ins. Ins.
B – π > (pσ)
1
1−σ
Figure 7: The steady state capital stock k˜ as a function of τ .
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When π > (pσ)1/(1−σ), ε(x˜) increases in τ if τ < τ , and decreases if τ > τ . Then, the
steady state capital stock k˜ is k˜i (and individuals insure) if τ ∈ [0, τc)∪ (τd, π], while it is k˜
n
(and individuals do not insure) if τ ∈ [τc, τd] with:
τc =

0 if δξ ≤ πσ
τ ⋆c if π
σ < δξ <
π
p
+ (1− σ)(pσ)
σ
1−σ
τ if δξ ≥
π
p
+ (1− σ)(pσ)
σ
1−σ
and τd =

π if δξ ≤
π
p
τ ⋆d if
π
p
< δξ <
π
p
+ (1− σ)(pσ)
σ
1−σ
τ if δξ ≥
π
p
+ (1− σ)(pσ)
σ
1−σ
where τ ⋆c ∈ (0, τ) and τ
⋆
d ∈ (τ , π) are the roots of function Λ(τ).
Since k˜i and k˜n, the steady state capital stock k˜ is always decreasing up to τ and increasing
afterwards. However, Figure 7B encompasses five parameters configurations in terms of
insurance behaviors. In two configurations the steady state insurance regime does not change
as τ varies. Indeed, individuals always (resp: never) insure when τc = τd = τ (resp: τc = 0
and τd = π). In two other configurations, as τ increases, only one change in the reference
regime is possible. This is the case where 0 = τc < τd < π or 0 < τc < τd = π. Finally, two
changes exist when 0 < τc < τ < τd < π.
The comparative statics with respect to τ are surprising. In the absence of family help
(see Figure 1), the effect of the tax rate on the capital stock is negative. With family help,
the intuition for Figure 7 is to be found in the relative costs and returns of the family norm
and of social LTC schemes. On the one hand, at the steady state, x + τ = π. This implies
that on the contribution side the two schemes are perfect substitutes. On the other hand,
the return of the social LTC contribution τw is constant and equal to 1/p , while the return
of xw decreases with x. As a consequence, when τ is big, x is small and yields a return that
can be higher than 1/p. Thus, an increase in τ causes a decrease in x, which in turn implies a
decline in LTC expenditures. To compensate for such a decline the individuals increasingly
turn to market sources of LTC financing, fostering capital accumulation. Of course, if π
is relatively small x is also relatively small, and might have a higher return than 1/p for
any level of τ . In this case, the steady state capital stock always increases if the tax rate
increases. This intuition also explains our finding that social and private LTC insurance can
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be complements: for sufficiently high levels of the tax, private LTC insurance may emerge as
the tax level increases. This message is counterintuitive but important: in presence of family
support individuals choose private LTC insurance if the pay-as-you-go social LTC insurance
is generous enough; and the more generous the latter, the higher the economic growth. Thus,
the fact that an aging population leads the State to establish generous unfunded social LTC
insurance may in some circumstances encourage individuals to ensure themselves privately
and is therefore beneficial for growth.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered that LTC can be financed by four different channels: savings,
private insurance, family help based on a norm, and an unfunded public scheme. Using a
simple OLG model we have obtained a number of interesting results along the equilibrium
path and on the stationary equilibrium.
In the benchmark case, namely without any family norm, the stock of capital evolves
monotonically, either upward or downward. Individuals resort to private insurance when
the loading factor is not too high. With the family norm, the evolution is not monotonic
anymore. Finally there are plausible cases in which, along the equilibrium path, people
switch their insurance behavior: they buy private insurance up to a certain period, then
they stop doing it, or vice versa.
Turning to the steady states, we study the effects of three key parameters: the tax rate,
the intensity of intergenerational imitation, and the probability of dependence. The relation
between the payroll tax and the capital stock is expected to be negative. However, it may
be positive when the family help is sizeably more productive that the other LTC financing
sources. Since social insurance crowds out family help, individuals may compensate by
increasing savings and private insurance. Not surprisingly, the intensity of intergenerational
imitation has a depressive effect on capital accumulation. The probability of dependence has
an effect on capital accumulation that depends on the prevalence of insurance. With private
insurance, it is always positive; without private insurance, its sign is ambiguous. Private
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insurance arises for a range of intermediate values of p. The introduction of a family norm
crowds out private insurance and reduces this range.
Even though our paper is basically positive, it has some interesting policy implications. In
particular, it indicates that the intervention of the State in LTC financing may not discourage
but foster capital accumulation through saving and private insurance purchase. This being
said, we should be extremely cautions in deriving policy recommendations. The optimal
allocation will depend on the social rate of discount but also on the resource allocation at
each period of time. If family assistance is clearly more effective than private insurance,
it might be desirable to have less capital accumulation and better LTC. Dealing with this
normative issue is beyond the scope of this paper and is clearly on our research agenda.
In this paper we take the family norm as given without any normative judgment. We
also assume identical individuals. If this were not the case and if people were to differ in the
extent of the filial norm they are subject to, we would end up with an unfair situation in
which only those with children willing and able to take care of them would receive the care
they need. In that case, there would be an additional role for the public sector (see on this
Stuifbergen and Van Delden (2011)).
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Appendices
Appendix A – Capital accumulation and insurance behavior.
An agent born in t chooses st and it to maximize Wt under the constraints st ≥ 0 and
it ≥ 0. After computations, the first order condition with respect to st is given by (4), and,
when it > 0, the first order condition with respect to it is equivalent to (5).
A.1 – Insurance behavior depending on δξ and ε(xt).
Merging (4) and (5) to eliminate their first term leads to the following equation: it/p =
ξst− ε(xt)wt+1/Rt+1. As δwt+1 = kt+1Rt+1 and kt+1 = st+ it, the equation can be rewritten
as [δ/p + ε(xt)]it = [δξ − ε(xt)]st. Then, agents purchase LTC insurance if and only if
δξ > ε(xt) and insurance behaviors are described by (6).
A.2 – Capital accumulation when it = 0.
As δwt+1 = kt+1Rt+1 and kt+1 = st, (4) is equivalent to −1/[(1 − τ − xt1l)wt − kt+1] +
δβp(1+ξ)/{[δ+τ/p+ψσ(xt)1l]kt+1}+δβ(1−p)/{[δ+γψ
σ(xt)1l]kt+1} = 0. As wt = A(1−α)k
α
t ,
we obtain {[δ + τ/p + ψσ(xt)1l][δ + γψ
σ(xt)1l] + δβp(1 + ξ)[δ + γψ
σ(xt)1l] + δβ(1 − p)[δ +
τ/p+ψσ(xt)1l)]}kt+1 = A(1−α)(1− τ −xt1l){δβp(1+ ξ)[δ+ γψ
σ(xt)1l]+ δβ(1−p)[δ+ τ/p+
ψσ(xt)]1l)]}k
α
t . Then, according to appendix A.1, kt+1 = ηdk
α
t when π = 0 and δξ ≤ ε(xt),
whereas kt+1 = η(xt)k
α
t when γ = 0, π > τ ≥ 0 and δξ ≤ ε(xt).
A.3 – Capital accumulation when it > 0.
As it > 0, we obtain from (6) that [δ/p + ε(xt)]it = [δξ − ε(xt)]st. Using (3), we then
get it = p[δξ − ε(xt)]kt+1/[δ(1 + pξ)] and st = [δ + pε(xt)]kt+1/[δ(1 + pξ)]. Using these
equations, we obtain δ(1 + pξ){st + it/p+ [τ/p+ ψ
σ(xt)1l]wt+1/Rt+1} = (1+ ξ)kt+1{δ + τ +
[p + (1 − p)γ]ψσ(xt)1l}. Using (2) and (5) we get βδA(1 − α)(1 + pξ)(1 − τ − xt1l)k
α
t =
{δ[1 + β(1 + pξ)] + τ + [p + (1 − p)γ]ψσ(xt)1l}kt+1. Then, according to Appendix A.1,
kt+1 = µdk
α
t when π = 0 and δξ > ε(xt), whereas kt+1 = µ(xt)k
α
t when γ = 0, π > τ ≥ 0
and δξ > ε(xt).
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Appendix B – Results of Section 3 (π = 0).
B.1 – Capital accumulation when π = 0.
According to Appendices A.2 and A.3, the dynamics are described by (8). Since the sign
of pδξ − τ is time-independent, no switch in the insurance behavior is possible. As kt+1 is
an increasing and concave function of kt, the capital stock kt converges monotonically to the
unique positive steady state kd. When τ = 0, since ηd = µd = ζp and pδξ > τ , individuals
insure and the dynamics of capital accumulation kt+1 = ζpk
α
t converge to kd|τ=0.
B.2 – Comparative statics with respect to p when π = τ = 0).
As ∂ζp/∂p = A(1− α)βξ/[1 + (1 + pξ)β]
2 is positive, kd|τ=0 = ζ
1
1−α
p increases in p.
B.3 – Comparative statics with respect to τ when π = 0.
As ∂ηd/∂τ = −Aαβ(1−α)
2p2(1+ξ)(1−τ)/{αp[1+(1+pξ)β]+(1−α)[1+(1−p)β]τ}2−
ηd/(1− τ) is negative, k
n
d = η
1
1−α
d decreases in τ . As the nominator of µd decreases in τ while
the nominator increases, kid = µ
1
1−α
d decreases in τ . Then, the capital stocks k
i
d and k
n
d
are both decreasing functions of τ . Using Appendix A.1, it is straightforward to show that
individuals insure if and only if τ < τa = min{pδξ, 1}. We thus obtain Figure 1.
Appendix C – Results of Section 4 (π > τ ≥ 0).
According to Appendices A.2 and A.3, we obtain the two dimensional dynamical system
described by (1) and (9). Then, the existence and the uniqueness of the positive steady
state, denoted (k˜, x˜), are straightforward.
C.1 – Dynamics of family help.
The dynamics of xt, described by (1) and represented Figure 2, are straightforward and
independent of k. Then, the locus xt+1 = xt expressed as a function of k is a vertical line
with abscissa x˜ in the plan (x, k). To the left of this line, xt+1−xt > 0 and, for any k > 0, xt
converges towards x˜. To the right of this line, xt+1−xt < 0 and, for any k > 0, xt converges
towards x˜.
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C.2 – Local dynamics with no insurance.
Assume that from a date κ ≥ 0, agents do not insure. The locus kt+1−kt = 0 as a function
of x can be written as g(x) = η(x)
1
1−α . Let us define a(x) = α[1+(1+pξ)β]+(1−α)[1+(1−
p)β]ε(x). After computations we get η′(x) = −η(x)/(1− τ − x)− αApβ(1− α)2(1 + ξ)(1−
τ − x)ε′(x)/a(x)2. Since 1− τ − x > 0, η(x) > 0, a(x) > 0, and ε′(x) = σπψ(x)σ−1 > 0, it is
straightforward to show that η′(x) < 0 and (1− τ − x)η′(x) + η(x) < 0. After computations
we also get η′′(x) = −[(1− τ −x)η′(x)+ η(x)]/(1− τ −x)2−αApβ(1−α)2(1+ ξ){[ε′′(x)(1−
τ − x)− ε′(x)]a(x)− 2a′(x)ε′(x)(1− τ − x)}/a(x)3. Since 1− τ − x > 0, a(x) > 0, ε′(x) > 0,
a′(x) > 0, (1 − τ − x)η′(x) + η(x) < 0, and ε′′(x) = −σ(1 − σ)π2ψ(x)σ−2 < 0 it is possible
to show that η′′(x) > 0.
As η(x) is a decreasing and convex function of x, g(x) is also a decreasing and convex
function of x. The equation kt+1 = g(x)
1−αkαt can be rewritten as kt+1−kt = [(g(x)/kt)
1−α−
1]kt. Thus, below the curve kt+1 = kt, for any x ∈ (0, 1 − τ), kt converges towards g(x).
Above the curve kt+1−kt < 0, for any x ∈ (0, 1− τ), kt converges towards g(x). Then, using
Appendix C.1, the dynamics in the neighborhood of (k˜n, x˜) are described in Figure 3A.
C.3 – Local dynamics with insurance.
Assume that from a date κ ≥ 0, agents insure. The locus kt+1 − kt = 0 as a function of
x can be written as h(x) = µ(x)
1
1−α . Let us define b(x) = α[1 + (1 + pξ)β] + (1 − α)pε(xt).
After computations, we get µ′(x) = −[1/(1 − τ − x) + b′(x)/b(x)]µ(x). Since µ(x) > 0,
b(x) > 0, and b′(x) = (1 − α)pσπψ(x)σ−1 > 0, it is straightforward to show that µ′(x) < 0
and µ′(x)+µ(x)/(1−τ−x) < 0. After computations we also get µ′′(x) = −[µ′(x)+µ(x)/(1−
τ − x)]/(1− τ − x)− µ′(x)b′(x)/b(x)− [b(x)b′′(x) − b′(x)2]µ(x)/b(x)2. Since 1 − τ − x > 0,
b(x) > 0, b′(x) > 0, b′′(x) = −(1 − α)pσ(1 − σ)π2ψ(x)σ−2 < 0, µ(x) > 0, µ′(x) < 0, and
µ′(x) + µ(x)/(1− τ − x) < 0, it is possible to show that µ′′(x) > 0.
Since µ(x) is a decreasing and convex function of x, h(x), which represents kt+1−kt = 0, is
also a decreasing and convex function of x. The equation kt+1 = h(x)
1−αkαt can be rewritten
as kt+1 − kt = [(h(x)/kt)
1−α − 1]kt. Below the curve kt+1 = kt, for any x ∈ (0, 1 − τ), kt
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converges towards h(x). Above the curve, for any x ∈ (0, 1− τ), kt converges towards h(x).
Then, using Appendix C.1, the dynamics in the neighborhood of (k˜i, x˜) are described in
Figure 3B.
C.4 – Global dynamics: the different regimes.
First, remark that µ(xt) = η(xt) if and only if δξ = ε(xt). Then, since η(xt) is decreasing
in ξ while µ(xt) increases in ξ, µ(xt) T η(xt) if and only if δξ T ε(xt). Since ε(x) increases
in x, g(x) and h(x) cannot cross in more than one point: the point xˆ such that ε(xˆ) =
δξ. Consequently, individuals insure for any xt < xˆ and do not insure for any xt > xˆ.
Since the dynamics of xt are monotonic (increasing if x0 < x˜ and decreasing if x0 > x˜)
and independent of kt, and using the fact that kt+1 = max{g(xt)
1−α, h(xt)
1−α}kαt , we can
distinguish four types of dynamics. Regime I occurs when δξ ≤ min{ε(x0), ε(x˜)}. As
g(x) ≥ h(x), agents do not insure and, according to Appendix C.2, we obtain the dynamics
of Figure 3A. Regime II occurs when δξ > max{ε(x0), ε(x˜)}. As h(x) > g(x), agents insure
and, according to Appendix C.3, we obtain the dynamics of Figure 3B. Regime III occurs
when ε(x˜) < δξ ≤ ε(x0). As long as t ≤ T = E [ln {π − τ − xˆ/(π − τ − x0)} / ln(π − τ)]+ 1,
xt > xˆ decreases and agents do not insure because h(x) ≤ g(x). When t > T , xt < xˆ,
h(x) > g(x) and individuals insure. Then, according to Appendices C.1 and C.2, we obtain
the dynamics of Figure 3C. Regime IV occurs when ε(x0) < δξ ≤ ε(x˜). As long as t < T
′ =
E [ln {xˆ− π + τ/(x0 − π + τ)} / ln(π − τ)] + 1, xt < xˆ increases and agents insure because
h(x) > g(x). When t ≥ T ′, xt > xˆ, h(x) ≤ g(x) and agents do not insure. Then, according
to Appendices C.1 and C.3, we obtain the dynamics of Figure 3D.
Appendix D – Comparative statics (π > τ ≥ 0).
D.1 – Insurance behavior according to π, p and τ .
By definition we have ε(x˜) ≡ τ/p + [1 − γ(1 + ξ)](π − τ)σ. As ∂ε(x˜)/∂π = [1 − γ(1 +
ξ)]σ(π− τ)σ−1, ε(x˜) is increasing in π. As ∂ε(x˜)/∂p = −τ/p2, ε(x˜) is independent of p when
τ = 0 and decreasing in p when τ > 0. As ∂ε(x˜)/∂τ = 1/p − [1 − γ(1 + ξ)]σ(π − τ)σ−1,
∂ε(x˜)/∂τ has the sign of τ − τ with τ = π − [pσ(1 − γ(1 + ξ))]1/(1−σ). Then, ε(x˜) always
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decreases in τ when π < [pσ(1 − γ(1 + ξ))]1/(1−σ) and is always decreasing up to τ and
increasing afterwards when π ≥ [pσ(1 − γ(1 + ξ))]σ−1. According to these variations and
since private LTC insurance is positive if and only if δξ > ε(x˜), it is straightforward to prove
the existence of the thresholds πa, pa, τb, τc, and τd and, consequently, to obtain the results
of the paragraph “Insurance behavior” in Section 4.3.
D.2 – Comparative statics with respect to π when π > τ ≥ 0.
Since ∂η(x˜)/∂π = −αA(1−α)2(1−π)βp(1+ξ)σ(π−τ)σ−1/{α[1+(1+pξ)β]+(1−α)[1+
(1 − p)β]ε(x˜)}2 − η(x˜)/(1 − π), then ∂η(x˜)/∂π < 0. Since the nominator of µ(x˜) decreases
in π while the nominator increases, then ∂µ(x˜)/∂π < 0. As η(x˜) and µ(x˜) are decreasing
functions of π, k˜n = η(x˜)
1
1−α and k˜i = µ(x˜)
1
1−α are also decreasing functions of π. According
to Appendix D.1, we thus obtain Figure 4.
D.3 – Comparative statics with respect to p when π > τ ≥ 0.
After computations, ∂η(x˜)/∂p has the sign of [δξ − ε(x˜)][α+ (1−α)ε(x˜)] + α(1 + ξ)τ/p,
and ∂µ(x˜)/∂p has the sign of [δξ − ε(x˜)] + (1 + pξ)τ/p.
Consider the subcase where τ = 0. If δξ ≤ ε(x˜) = πσ, then individuals do not insure and
∂η(x˜)/∂p < 0. Then, k˜n = η(x˜)
1
1−α is decreasing in p. If δξ > πσ, individuals insure and
∂µ(x˜)/∂p > 0. Then, k˜i = µ(x˜)
1
1−α is increasing in p. We thus obtain Figure 5.
Consider the subcase where τ > 0. As p increases from 0 to 1, the threshold ε(x˜) decreases
from +∞ to τ + (π − τ)σ. Consequently, when δξ ≤ τ + (π − τ)σ individuals decide not to
insure and the steady state capital stock is k˜n. As ε(x˜) = τ/p+(π−τ)σ, the sign of ∂η(x˜)/∂p
is, after computations, the one of λ(p) ≡ [δξ−(π−τ)σ][δ+(π−τ)σ]p2+2[δξ−(π−τ)σ]τp−τ 2.
When δξ ≤ (π − τ)σ, it is straightforward that ∂η(x˜)/∂p < 0. Then k˜n = η(x˜)
1
1−α is always
decreasing in p. When (π − τ)σ < δξ ≤ τ + (π − τ)σ, λ(p) is increasing in p and is negative
in p = 0. Then, there exists a (unique) threshold p such that η(x˜) (and also k˜n = η(x˜)
1
1−α )
is decreasing up to p and increasing afterwards. We thus obtain Figure 6A.
When δξ > τ + (π − τ)σ, pa = τ/[δξ − (π− τ)
σ] ∈ (0, 1) and individuals decide to insure
if and only if p > pa. When p ≤ pa the steady state capital stock is k˜
n. According to the
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previous paragraph, k˜n is decreasing up to p and increasing afterwards.24 When p > pa, the
steady state capital stock is k˜i. Since δξ > ε, we have ∂µ(x˜)/∂p > 0. Then, k˜i = µ(x˜)
1
1−α is
increasing in p. We thus obtain Figure 6B.
D.4 – Comparative statics with respect to τ when π > τ ≥ 0.
It is straightforward that both ∂η(x˜)/∂τ and ∂µ(x˜)/∂τ have the opposite sign of ∂ε(x˜)/∂τ .
Consider the subcase where 0 < π < (pσ)1/(1−σ). As ∂ε(x˜)/∂τ < 0, k˜n = η(x˜)
1
1−α and
k˜i = µ(x˜)
1
1−α increase in τ . According to Appendix D.1, we thus obtain Figure 7A. Con-
sider now the subcase where π > (pσ)1/(1−σ). As ∂ε(x˜)/∂τ has the sign of τ − τ with
τ = π − (pσ)1/(1−σ), k˜n = η(x˜)
1
1−α and k˜i = µ(x˜)
1
1−α increase (resp: decrease) in τ if τ is
greater (resp: lower) than τ . According to Appendix D.1, we thus obtain Figure 7B.
24Note that λ(pa) = δ(1 + ξ)paτ , which, together with λ
′(p) > 0, implies that pa > p.
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